In February 2018, a jury at Southwark Crown Court convicted Skansen Interiors of failing to prevent bribery. The company had a general ethics policy, reminder posters on the office wall, and a rule requiring two signatures on significant payments. It was not enough. Skansen remains the only company to have put the adequate procedures defence to a jury, and it lost.
That case frames the practical question under the UK Bribery Act 2010. The Act reaches private-sector bribery as well as public, allows no exemption for facilitation payments, and makes an organisation criminally liable for bribery committed by anyone performing services on its behalf, with no need to prove intent at corporate level. Section 7(2) offers one statutory defence, and the burden of proving it sits with the company.
What the UK Bribery Act prohibits
The Act creates four offences. Section 1 covers offering, promising or giving a financial or other advantage to induce or reward the improper performance of a function. Section 2 mirrors it, covering requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting one. Together they apply to any function of a public nature, any activity connected with a business, and anything performed in the course of employment, which brings commercial bribery between two private companies squarely within scope.
Improper performance means a breach of an expectation of good faith, impartiality or trust. The test is what a reasonable person in the UK would expect, and the Ministry of Justice guidance is explicit that local custom or practice is disregarded unless it is written into the applicable law.
Section 6 deals with bribery of a foreign public official. The prosecution must show an intention to influence the official and to obtain or retain business, but it does not have to prove improper performance at all. The only carve-out is where written local law permits or requires the official to be influenced, a high and documentary bar.
The failure to prevent bribery offence (Section 7)
A commercial organisation commits an offence under section 7 when a person associated with it bribes someone, intending to obtain or retain business or a business advantage for the organisation. Nothing else needs to be shown. The company does not have to know, approve, or benefit. Prosecutors do not even need a conviction against the individual who paid the bribe, only proof that the underlying conduct amounted to an offence under section 1 or section 6.
This is strict corporate liability, and it is the reason the Act matters well beyond the UK. Almost every other anti-bribery regime requires the prosecution to attribute a guilty state of mind to the organisation. Section 7 removes that step entirely and replaces it with a question the company has to answer: were the procedures adequate?
The scope of associated person is deliberately wide. Section 8 defines it as anyone who performs services for or on behalf of the organisation, in whatever capacity, judged on all the circumstances and not on the label in the contract. Employees are presumed to qualify, as can agents, distributors, intermediaries, consultants and some suppliers. The guidance does set limits: a joint venture entity is not automatically associated with each of its members, and a parent is not automatically liable for a subsidiary unless the subsidiary intended to benefit it.
That breadth matters because third parties are where the exposure concentrates. The OECD's 2014 Foreign Bribery Report, which analysed 427 concluded enforcement actions, found that intermediaries were involved in three out of four cases.
Who the Act applies to
For sections 1, 2 and 6, UK courts have jurisdiction whenever any part of the offence takes place in the UK. Conduct entirely abroad is still caught where the person has a close connection with the UK, which covers British nationals, people ordinarily resident here, and bodies incorporated here.
Section 7 goes further. It applies to any body incorporated in the UK, wherever it operates, and to any organisation formed anywhere that carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the UK. Once that test is met, the bribe can have been paid anywhere, by anyone performing services for the company.
Where the line falls is less settled than it looks. The Ministry of Justice guidance says organisations without a demonstrable business presence in the UK are not caught, and that neither a listing on the UK Listing Authority's Official List nor an independently operating UK subsidiary suffices on its own. No contested ruling has yet defined the test. Airbus SE, a Dutch-registered company, simply accepted that it was a relevant commercial organisation when it resolved five section 7 counts in 2020.
The adequate procedures defence
Section 7(2) gives the organisation a full defence if it proves it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent associated persons from bribing. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, which is lower than the criminal standard, but the burden has shifted: the company has to make the case, not rebut one.
The Act itself does not define adequate. Section 9 required the government to publish guidance instead, and the Ministry of Justice did so in March 2011. That document, still the current version, sets out six principles. They are outcome-based rather than prescriptive, and the guidance is clear that procedures should be proportionate to the bribery risk a given organisation actually faces.
Proportionate procedures
Procedures should be proportionate to the risks faced and to the scale and complexity of the organisation's activities. A domestic business with no public-sector exposure is not expected to run the programme a defence exporter runs. The guidance expects gift and hospitality rules, controls over political and charitable donations, whistleblowing channels, and financial controls covering bookkeeping, auditing and expenditure approval.
Top-level commitment
The board and senior management are expected to foster a culture in which bribery is never acceptable, through a stated commitment and through involvement in building the programme. Enforcement outcomes track this: in approving the Airbus and Entain agreements, the courts gave weight to new leadership and reformed compliance arrangements.
Risk assessment
The organisation assesses its exposure to bribery risk, internally and externally, periodically and in documented form. The guidance separates external risks such as country, sector, transaction and business partnership from internal ones, which include deficient training, a bonus culture that rewards excessive risk-taking, and a lack of clear financial controls.
Due diligence
Due diligence applies to persons who perform or will perform services for the organisation, on a risk-based and proportionate basis. Since intermediaries feature in most foreign bribery cases, this principle carries disproportionate weight. It covers onboarding checks, the commercial rationale for a relationship, and whether what an agent is paid matches the service delivered.
Communication and training
Policies have to be embedded and understood throughout the organisation, through internal and external communication and through training proportionate to risk. The distinction between publishing a policy and communicating it is precisely what the prosecution exploited in Skansen.
Monitoring and review
The organisation monitors and reviews its procedures and improves them where necessary. The guidance suggests staff surveys and training feedback, formal periodic reviews reported to senior management, and external verification. It also makes a point worth noting: certification to an anti-bribery standard does not in itself mean procedures are adequate. Most usefully for audit and finance teams, it states that systems set up to deter, detect and investigate bribery, and to monitor the ethical quality of transactions, such as internal financial control mechanisms, will help show whether procedures work.
What "adequate" actually means in practice
The six principles describe what a programme should contain. They do not say what persuades a court. The enforcement record is thin on that question, because almost every corporate matter since 2011 has ended in a guilty plea or a deferred prosecution agreement. Camilla de Silva, then joint head of bribery and corruption at the Serious Fraud Office, said after Skansen that the SFO had yet to meet a company confident enough in its programme to run the defence in court.
Skansen is therefore the clearest available signal, and it points at evidence more than documentation. The company had procedures of a kind. What it could not produce was proof that they operated: no anti-bribery policy specific to the risk, no record that staff had been made aware of what existed, nothing showing the controls had been tested. The prosecution pointed at the policy the incoming chief executive wrote after the event as a measure of what had been missing before it.
A jury gives no reasons, so no one can state definitively why the defence failed. But the gap it exposed is the one most programmes still carry. A file that proves adequacy looks different from a file that describes a programme.
Principle |
What the file has to show |
|---|---|
Proportionate procedures |
Controls mapped to the specific risks named in the assessment, with dated versions and a record of what changed and why |
Top-level commitment |
Board and committee minutes recording review of bribery risk, a named senior owner, and resourcing decisions |
Risk assessment |
Dated assessments covering country, sector, transaction and partner risk, and evidence that findings changed the control set |
Due diligence |
Screening records per third party, the commercial rationale for each relationship, payment terms benchmarked against services delivered, and re-screening dates |
Communication and training |
Completion rates by role, entity and seniority, attestations, and follow-up on non-completion |
Monitoring and review |
Test results across the transaction population: payments to unapproved or newly created vendors, hospitality against policy thresholds, commissions against contracted rates, round-sum and threshold-splitting patterns |
The last row is the one most competitors treat as an afterthought, and it is the only principle that cannot be satisfied with a document. Monitoring produces evidence only if something was actually tested, and sampling a few hundred payments once a year does not show that controls operated across the population exposed to the risk. This is where continuous control monitoring changes what the file contains. Supervizor runs its control library across 100% of transactions at every data extraction, so anomaly detection on third-party payments, expenses and accounting entries leaves a dated, reproducible audit trail. Its compliance solution is built around that output.
UK Bribery Act vs FCPA
Organisations exposed to both regimes cannot run one programme designed to the US standard and assume it satisfies the UK one. The two laws differ on the points that determine liability.
UK Bribery Act 2010 |
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
|
|---|---|---|
Sector covered |
Public and private sector bribery |
Foreign public officials only under the anti-bribery provisions |
Facilitation payments |
No exemption |
Exception for payments that expedite routine governmental action |
Intent required |
None at corporate level under section 7; the associated person must intend to benefit the organisation |
Corrupt intent required; individual criminal liability requires wilfulness |
Compliance programme |
Full statutory defence under section 7(2) |
Not a defence; relevant to charging, resolution form and penalty |
Books and records |
No equivalent accounting offence; false accounting is prosecuted separately |
Accounting and internal controls provisions apply to issuers |
Reach |
Section 7 applies to any organisation carrying on business in the UK, for bribery anywhere |
Issuers, domestic concerns, and acts committed within US territory |
The consequence is that a UK-exposed programme has to be defensible as evidence. In the US it earns credit at the resolution and sentencing stage. In the UK it either satisfies a jury or it does not.
Enforcement posture has also diverged. US enforcement was paused by executive order in February 2025 and resumed in June 2025 under narrowed Department of Justice priorities, producing seven DOJ actions in 2025 and none from the SEC. UK and European authorities moved the other way, with the SFO, France's Parquet National Financier and Switzerland's Office of the Attorney General announcing an International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce on 20 March 2025. For the US regime in detail, see the FCPA guide and the review of FCPA compliance software.
Penalties and enforcement
Individuals convicted under sections 1, 2 or 6 face up to 10 years' imprisonment and an unlimited fine. Organisations face an unlimited fine, and under section 7 a fine is the only available sentence. Corporate fines follow the Sentencing Council's 2014 guideline for fraud, bribery and money laundering, which takes a harm figure, usually gross profit from the contracts obtained, and applies a culpability multiplier of 20% to 400%.
The consequences that follow the fine often matter more. Confiscation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 applies on top. Directors can be disqualified, as the two individuals in the Skansen matter were for six and seven years, alongside prison sentences. A conviction also reaches public procurement. Under the Procurement Act 2023, in force since February 2025, a conviction under section 1, 2 or 6 is a mandatory exclusion ground, with a five-year look-back and possible entry on a central debarment list. It can be triggered by the conviction of a connected person such as a parent company. A section 7 conviction is not on the mandatory list and leads only to discretionary exclusion.
The SFO's resolution record gives the sense of scale. Rolls-Royce agreed a deferred prosecution agreement in January 2017 covering 12 counts, five under section 7, with £258.17m disgorged and a £239.08m penalty. Airbus followed in January 2020 with five section 7 counts and a UK component of €990.96m, part of a €3.59bn global settlement. Glencore Energy (UK) was convicted instead, paying £280.97m in November 2022 on five section 1 and two section 7 counts. Entain reached a £585m agreement with the Crown Prosecution Service in December 2023.
After a five-year gap, the SFO concluded its thirteenth agreement in May 2026 with Ultra Electronics over three section 7 counts in Algeria and Oman, with a £10.08m penalty and £4.80m in costs. Its April 2025 guidance had set the terms: a company that self-reports promptly and cooperates fully will be invited to negotiate an agreement unless exceptional circumstances apply, with contact within 48 business hours. Rolls-Royce did not self-report, and the judge observed that without the cooperation that followed, prosecution would have been hard to avoid.
Conclusion
The defence under section 7(2) is proved with evidence, and the one company that tried it could not produce any. Before the next risk assessment cycle, the useful exercise is to take each of the six principles and ask what file would be handed to counsel tomorrow. For five of them the answer is documents. For monitoring and review it is test results, which exist only if the testing happened. Further reading sits in the anti-corruption hub.
FAQ
Frequently Asked Questions
Not by itself. The guidance accepts reasonable and proportionate hospitality as a legitimate part of doing business. The question is whether the advantage was meant to induce improper performance, which is why thresholds, pre-approval and testing of actual expense data matter more than the policy wording.
No. Unlike the FCPA, the Act contains no exemption for small payments that expedite routine official action. They can constitute an offence under section 1 or 6, and so expose the organisation under section 7. The only flexibility is prosecutorial discretion on the public interest.
Yes, under section 7, if it carries on a business or part of a business in the UK. A UK listing or an independently operating subsidiary does not on its own establish that presence. Once it is established, the bribe can have occurred anywhere.
It is the only statutory defence to section 7. A company can also contest whether bribery occurred, whether the person was associated with it, or whether the jurisdictional test is met.
Self-reporting to the SFO's Intelligence Division brings the April 2025 cooperation framework into play. A suspicious activity report alone does not count unless the SFO is notified at the same time.
Primarily the SFO for serious or complex cases. The CPS also prosecutes, and brought both the Skansen conviction and the Entain agreement.
No. The guidance states directly that certification does not necessarily mean procedures are adequate. It evidences design; the defence turns on operation.
Alban Clot began his career in consulting, where he spent several years as a Partner specializing in improving the quality of financial processes for large corporations. He then founded Supervizor in 2016, where he currently serves as Co-CEO in charge of product strategy. Alban is a graduate of ESCP Business School.
